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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
  ____________ 
 
Nos. 15-1231, 15-1868 
____________ 
 
KOYODE NIRAN AKINNIYI, 
                                            Petitioner 
 
 v. 
 
 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
                                          Respondent 
____________ 
 
On Petition for Review of a Final Order 
 of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(A093-014-174) 
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 20, 2015 
 
Before:  AMBRO, HARDIMAN and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges. 
  
(Filed: November 23, 2015) 
 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
 
                                              
 * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
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HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Koyode Akinniyi petitions for review of a decision by the Board of Immigration 
Appeals (BIA) denying his motion to reopen his removal proceedings. Because 
Akinniyi’s first argument fails as a matter of law and his second claim fails for lack of 
jurisdiction, we will deny the petition in part and dismiss it in part. 
I 
 Akinniyi is a native and citizen of Nigeria. He entered the United States without 
inspection in 1981 and has been a legal permanent resident since 1990. Akinniyi’s 
proceedings date back to 2002, when he was convicted in the U.S. District Court for the 
Northern District of Illinois of “fraud and other related activities in connection with 
access devices” (essentially, theft by deception and possession of several stolen credit 
cards) in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 10(29)(a)(2). His actions caused a loss of $34,000 to 
Citibank. As an alien convicted of an aggravated felony, Akinniyi was removable under 8 
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M) (designating as an aggravated 
felony any offense “involv[ing] fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victim or victims 
exceeds $10,000”). The Government commenced removal proceedings in August 2002 
by issuing a Notice to Appear (NTA) in immigration court.  
 A series of immigration court hearings followed. Akinniyi first appeared in 
October 2002 without counsel, so the IJ granted him a two-month adjournment to obtain 
counsel. Akinniyi returned to his next hearing without counsel, but because he expressed 
a fear of persecution in Nigeria, the IJ granted him a two-week adjournment so he could 
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complete an asylum application. When Akinniyi returned for his third hearing—this time 
represented by attorney Sandra Greene—he failed to present the court with an asylum 
application, so Akinniyi’s prior request for asylum was deemed abandoned. Although the 
IJ scheduled a fourth hearing for February 2003, he indicated that he was likely to decide 
the case before then. 
 The IJ made good on his word, issuing a written decision several days prior to the 
fourth hearing. The IJ held that Akinniyi was removable as charged in the NTA and had 
abandoned his request for asylum by failing to file an application by the court’s deadline. 
This decision was mailed to Greene, who allegedly failed to inform Akinniyi of the 
decision. Akinniyi did not appeal the decision to the BIA. 
 More than seven years later, in May 2010, Akinniyi retained a different attorney, 
Yakov Spektor, who filed a “motion to reopen an in absentia order” on Akinniyi’s behalf. 
App. 360–63. The IJ denied the motion because the removal order was not issued in 
absentia. Akinniyi did not appeal this decision either.  
The petition for review at issue relates to Akinniyi’s second motion to reopen, 
filed four years after the first and more than eleven years after the IJ’s order of removal. 
Akinniyi made two arguments in support of reopening. First, he alleged that Green 
rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to file an asylum application and by 
failing to notify him of the IJ’s decision, and that Spektor was ineffective by filing the 
wrong type of motion to reopen. Consequently, Akinniyi claimed he was entitled to sua 
sponte reopening of his case and equitable tolling of the time limitation on his motion to 
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reopen. Akinniyi also invoked the changed-country-conditions exception to the time 
limitations on motions to reopen, asserting that reopening was necessary so he could 
apply for asylum based on the emergence of the terrorist group Boko Haram in Nigeria 
and his allegedly well-founded fear that he was at risk of persecution at their hands given 
his status as a Westernized individual with a child born out of wedlock.  
The IJ denied Akinniyi’s second motion, concluding that he had failed to explain 
the nature of his agreement and communications with Greene with sufficient detail to 
show ineffective assistance and that there was no prejudice in Spektor’s filing of a 
deficient motion because the court didn’t deny Akinniyi’s second motion as number-
barred. The IJ also held that Akinniyi had failed to demonstrate due diligence in pursuing 
his case in the seven years after Greene’s alleged ineffective assistance surrounding the 
removal order and the three years after Spektor’s alleged ineffective assistance. As for 
Akinniyi’s changed-country-conditions argument, the IJ determined: (1) that Akinniyi 
had failed to demonstrate materiality because the evidence suggested that Boko Haram 
was active mainly in areas far from Akinniyi’s home region of Nigeria, and (2) that 
Akinniyi had not demonstrated prima facie eligibility for asylum because he had shown 
neither that his alleged social groups were cognizable under immigration law nor that he 
was likely to be persecuted due to his membership in them.  
  The BIA affirmed on the same grounds. Akinniyi filed this petition for review.1 
                                              
 1 Akinniyi originally filed a petition for review of the Board’s decision with this 
Court on January 23, 2015—more than thirty days after the December 9, 2014, 
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II 
A 
 Akinniyi first argues that his attorneys’ alleged ineffective assistance entitled him 
to equitable tolling of the time limitation pertaining to motions to reopen.2 We have 
recognized that “[i]neffective assistance of counsel can serve as a basis for equitable 
tolling if substantiated and accompanied by a showing of due diligence.” Alzaarir v. Att’y 
Gen., 639 F.3d 86, 90 (3d Cir. 2011). See also Mahmood v. Gonzales, 427 F.3d 248, 252 
(3d Cir. 2005) (even if “the attorney conduct at issue is sufficient . . . to provide a basis 
for equitable tolling,” lack of diligence defeats the claim).  
 The BIA held that Akinniyi was not entitled to equitable tolling because he had 
failed to exercise due diligence. We defer to the IJ’s factual findings and consider only 
whether they amount to a lack of due diligence as a matter of law. Kamara v. Att’y Gen., 
420 F.3d 202, at 210–11 (3d Cir. 2005); Sukwanputra v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 627, 631 (3d 
Cir. 2006) (“Insofar as the BIA adopted the findings of the IJ, we must review the 
decision of the IJ.”). The IJ found that Akinniyi exercised a “complete lack of action for 
eight years after Ms. Greene’s representation,” failed to “obtain counsel to move to 
reopen his case and file for asylum or other relief from removal,” and neglected to 
“investigate his immigration status.” App. 87. The IJ also found that Akinniyi “was put 
                                                                                                                                                  
decision—rendering his petition untimely under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1). We will dismiss 
this first petition. The Board reissued its decision at Akinniyi’s request and he filed the 
timely petition now before us on April 9, 2015. 
2 We have jurisdiction to review this claim because we are permitted to review 
constitutional claims and questions of law. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C)–(D). 
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on notice of his written order of removal and his right to file a motion to reopen in 2010” 
when his first motion to reopen was denied, but nevertheless had “no excuse” for failing 
to “follow[] up” for more than three years before finally filing his second motion. App. 
87.  
 The IJ did not err in holding that these facts demonstrate a lack of due diligence.3 
We have held a lack of due diligence to have been established by behavior less dawdling 
than this, including where a petitioner waited more than a year between filings of 
successive motions to reopen or failed to take “steps to inquire about the status of his 
case” over a period of many months. See Mahmood, 427 F.3d at 252; Alzaarir, 639 F.3d 
at 90. Accordingly, Akinniyi’s equitable tolling claim fails as a matter of law.  
B 
 Akinniyi next argues that the BIA erred when it determined that his motion did not 
meet the changed-country-conditions exception to the 90-day filing requirement for 
motions to reopen. We lack jurisdiction over this argument because the Board’s 
conclusion that Akinniyi failed to demonstrate a material change in Nigeria’s conditions 
for purposes of asylum is an unreviewable finding of fact. See Sukwanputra, 434 F.3d at 
635; Jarbough v. Att’y Gen., 483 F.3d 184, 189 (3d Cir. 2007) (“[C]hallenges to the 
BIA’s extraordinary or changed circumstances determinations do not constitute 
                                              
3 The Government wrongly asserts that “a due diligence determination is a factual 
determination.” See Bank of U.S. v. Tyler, 29 U.S. 366, 373 (1830) (“Due diligence is a 
question of law to the court, when the facts are ascertained.”); Borges v. Gonzales, 402 
F.3d 398, 407 (3d Cir. 2005) (assessing due diligence “as a matter of law”); United States 
v. Felton, 811 F.2d 190, 209 (3d Cir. 1987) (same).  
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‘questions of law’ within the meaning of § 1252(a)(2)(D).”). Nor do we have jurisdiction 
to review the BIA’s determination that Akinniyi failed to demonstrate prima facie 
eligibility for asylum. Whether a petitioner has demonstrated a well-founded fear of 
future persecution is a “question of fact, and the agency determination must be upheld if 
it is supported by substantial evidence in the record.” Camara v. Att’y Gen., 580 F.3d 
196, 201 (3d Cir. 2009), as amended (Nov. 4, 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s finding that the evidence does not 
establish that Akinniyi is likely to be persecuted upon return to Nigeria. 
III 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny Akinniyi’s petition in part and dismiss it 
in part. 
